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Abstract: 
I investigate public opinion toward Chinese FDI inflows in advanced economies, comparing 
attitudes toward such investment with attitudes toward American and European FDI inflows. 
Specifically, I probe whether the threats of technology transfer and of social dumping associated 
with Chinese FDI resonate among the key target audiences. First, I expect managers to oppose 
Chinese FDI, while I do not expect similar opposition to American or European FDI. Second, I 
expect union members to oppose Chinese FDI, and to support European FDI more than they do 
American and, especially, Chinese FDI. Using original survey data from Switzerland, I find 
strong support for the expectations regarding managers. Surprisingly, union members do not 
oppose Chinese FDI, but they support European and to a lesser extent American FDI. The 
findings point to occupational characteristics and unions as key factors shaping FDI preferences, 
and suggest that the demand-side politics of Chinese inward FDI is unique. 
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1. Introduction 
The world economy is rapidly turning from “made in China” to “owned by China” 
(Nolan, 2012). China’s growing overseas engagement through foreign direct investment (FDI) 
over the past decade has provoked mixed and often heated reactions around the world. The 
European Union has taken a more lenient stance toward Chinese inward FDI compared to the 
United States, where some high-profile deals were abandoned when they run into political 
opposition based on national security concerns (Frye & Pinto, 2009; Meunier, 2014; Tingley, Xu, 
Chilton, & Milner 2015). Yet, as China’s buying spree intensified, the mood in Europe has been 
cooling down. Some politicians have started to openly criticize the acquisition of technology 
firms and leading brands, in particular by Chinese state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, political 
criticism has turned into protectionism. In 2017, and again in 2018, Germany tightened its 
foreign investment law to increase its powers to block deals deemed to endanger national 
security, a law primarily aimed at Chinese takeovers (Financial Times, 2018a). Germany’s 
tougher stance is part of a global backlash against Chinese acquisitions (South China Morning 
Post, 2018; Blick, 2018). In Europe alone, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and the 
United Kingdom have recently strengthened or are in the process of strengthening their FDI 
screening regimes, while Belgium, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and Switzerland are considering setting up or strengthening 
investment review mechanisms (Baker McKenzie, 2019; SRF, 2019). 
Although protectionist sentiment toward Chinese takeovers has been growing in advanced 
economies in recent years, we know virtually nothing about what economic and socio-cultural 
factors drive individuals’ opposition to Chinese incoming FDI. One key challenge has been data 
availability, since existing surveys typically probe opinions about the growing economic 
importance of China, the alignment of interests between a given country and China when dealing 
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with globalization, bilateral trade relations, etc, but not the views individuals hold on Chinese 
inward FDI. So far, only a few studies have investigated the determinants of individual attitudes 
toward FDI. Using observational data, scholars have found preferences over “generic” FDI to be 
egocentric based on broad factors such as labor’s skill level (Pandya, 2010). Using survey 
experiments, others have established that the country of origin of the foreign investors is a 
significant determinant of levels of opposition, with Chinese FDI most strongly opposed (Jensen 
& Lindstädt 2013), and that the policies that other countries adopt shape public attitudes toward 
FDI (Chilton, Milner, & Tingley, 2017). While the former do not consider the possibility that the 
pattern of opposition to Chinese FDI might differ from the pattern of opposition to foreign 
investment in general, the latter consider how attitudes vary depending on key features of the 
transactions -- country of origin of the investors, reciprocity, but also size of the acquired firm, 
ownership of the investor amongst others (Chilton et al., 2017) -- but not how individual-level 
characteristics of the respondents shape their attitudes toward FDI. 
I contend that individual attitudes toward Chinese FDI are indeed unique because of 
unique features of Chinese investment and/or of the Chinese political economy (Meunier, 
Burgoon, & Jacoby, 2014). I focus on what are arguably the main fears related to the potentially 
negative economic consequences arising from Chinese FDI in advanced economies. The first 
concern is the fear (or threat) of technology transfer or theft and shop closure associated with 
asset stripping strategies. I argue that managers will be particularly preoccupied by this issue and 
therefore be strongly opposed to Chinese incoming investment. The second concern associated 
with Chinese investment is social dumping, that is the threat Chinese investors might pose to 
workers’ interests by undermining collective bargaining institutions and lowering labor (and 
social) standards. Given China’s comparative advantage in low-skill, low-wage and low value-
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added production, and Chinese employers’ poor reputation in dealing with workers at home and 
abroad, I expect trade union members to oppose Chinese investment. 
To probe the uniqueness of attitudes toward Chinese investment, I design a comparative 
study. The comparative dimension consists in comparing attitudes toward foreign investment 
from China, the United States (US), and Europe in one advanced industrial country. In 
comparative perspective, I argue that asset striping is a threat that is most strongly associated 
with Chinese inward investment, such that managers will not display similar opposition to 
American or European incoming investment. As far as labor market effects are concerned, 
although workers and their representatives ought to be ambivalent about inward FDI and perhaps 
even welcome such investment, investors from communist China and from liberal America might 
have a poorer reputation among workers and their representatives than their counterparts from 
social Europe. Accordingly, I expect trade union members to less strongly support American and, 
especially, Chinese FDI than they do support European investment. 
To test these hypotheses, I use original survey data from my topical module on Swiss 
foreign economic relations that was designed specifically for this study and fielded as part of a 
nationally representative survey – the “Measurement and Observation of Social Attitudes in 
Switzerland” (MOSAiCH) cross-sectional survey – in 2015. The module and the broader survey 
in which it is integrated allow to adjudicate between various material self-interest explanations 
and to examine the effect of union membership, while controlling for key socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents, their ideology, pre-existing cultural disposition, socio-tropic 
perceptions, opinions on international trade, and, importantly, their understanding of economic 
issues. In short, I have a unique dataset that allows to systematically investigate attitudes toward 
Chinese FDI at a point in time when Chinese investment gained traction across advanced 
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economies, and to test arguments about the uniqueness of Chinese investment by comparing the 
attitudes of Swiss citizens toward inward FDI from China, the US, and Europe. 
The empirical analysis confirms the prominent role of managers in the politics of Chinese 
inward FDI, on the one hand, and the distinctiveness of the politics of Chinese inward FDI, on 
the other hand. First, I find strong support for the expectations regarding managers’ inward FDI 
preferences. Swiss managers oppose Chinese FDI inflows, while they do not oppose either 
American or European FDI. Second, I do not find empirical evidence that trade union members 
oppose Chinese investment. However, I find that they support European FDI and, to a lesser 
extent, American FDI, where they do not support Chinese FDI. In all, the findings suggest that 
the fear of technology transfer, rather than the fear of social dumping, drives the opposition to 
Chinese FDI in advanced economies and that the demand-side politics of Chinese inward FDI is 
indeed unique. 
To my knowledge, this is the first study using observational data that investigates 
individual-level determinants of citizens’ attitudes toward FDI inflows from China in 
comparative perspective in an advanced economy. The paper makes four main contributions. 
First, it speaks to ongoing debates about whether foreign economic policy preferences are 
egocentric (e.g., Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Mansfield & Mutz, 2009, 2013; Fordham & 
Kleinberg, 2012; DiGiuseppe & Kleinberg, 2018), and if so, on what basis -- factors, firms or 
occupations (Pandya 2010; Bearce & Tuxhorn, 2017; Owen & Johnston, 2017)? Second, it adds 
to the literature on whether trade unions influence their members’ preferences over foreign 
economic policy (Ahlquist, Clayton, & Levi, 2014; Kim & Margalit, 2017)? While these debates 
have mainly focused on trade, this paper focuses on inward FDI. Third, by systematically 
comparing attitudes toward foreign investment from China, the US and Europe, I contribute to 
the debate on whether China is unique among international investors. Finally, there is good 
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reason to believe that public attitudes toward Chinese FDI are substantively important for broader 
outcomes of interest, such as actual restrictions on Chinese FDI. While public preferences do not 
directly translate into policy but are filtered through domestic political institutions which 
aggregate conflicting societal interests and condition the bargaining between opposing groups 
(Lake, 2009), in democracies due to electoral accountability there is a fair amount of consistency 
between public opinion and public policy in the medium to long term (Monroe, 1979). 
 
2. Literature and Argument 
 While there is a plethora of studies on individual trade policy preferences, much less is 
known about individual-level FDI policy formation. The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) and Ricardo-
Viner (R-V) models of international trade are the workhorse models from which the trade policy 
preferences of individual people are traditionally derived. “New” new trade theory’s (NNTT) 
approach to heterogeneous firms (Melitz, 2003) predicts individual trade policy preferences to 
flow from firm-level characteristics such as productivity that vary within industry rather than 
from the relatively abundant or scarce supplies of broad factors of production such as capital, 
labor, and land (as in H-O), or from sectors that are export- or import-competing (as in R-V). The 
literature has also identified home ownership (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001), nationalism 
(O’Rourke, Sinnott, Richardson, & Rodrik, 2001), education (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006), 
consumer prices (Baker, 2005), concerns for national economic performance (Mainsfield & 
Mutz, 2009), amongst others, as factors that influence individual trade policy preferences. 
Studies on the determinants of public support for FDI flows have tended to focus on how 
skills influence individual support for FDI inflows (Pandya, 2010; see also Kaya & Walker, 
2012). Building on a specific factors model that assumes industry-specific capital and labor 
mobility, Pandya (2010) argues that workers are likely to support FDI inflows because it 
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increases their wages via higher labor demand (or via lowers product prices), and that skilled 
workers have a higher probability of supporting foreign investment because they are the greatest 
beneficiaries of FDI inflows. The logic is as follows. Capital inflows into an industry increase 
worker productivity. Higher productivity among multinational companies reinforces this effect 
because they tend to be technological leaders that introduce more efficient systems of work 
organization and production than do domestic firms. At this higher marginal revenue product, 
foreign firms expand production, hiring workers away from domestic firms by offering higher 
wages. Given labor mobility, these gains accrue to all workers in the economy. In short, firms re-
establish the equality of wages and marginal revenue at a higher wage level, with the implication 
that the returns of domestic capital owners decline as a share of capital income is redistributed to 
workers in the form of higher wages. Labor gains, skilled labor gains even more. Using public 
opinion data from 18 Latin American countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s the author finds 
that preferences over FDI are a function of FDI’s effects on income. 
Linsi (2017) distinguishes between mass attitudes toward two main types of inward FDI, 
namely Greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using nationally 
representative data from his own survey fielded in 2016 in the United Kingdom, he shows that 
older individuals (born before 1960) are more likely to oppose M&As (but not Greenfield 
investment) than younger individuals (born after 1975). The explanation provided is socialization 
during late adolescence and early adulthood: older cohorts grew up in a period where the public 
economic discourse, characterized by economic statism, was hostile to M&As whereas younger 
cohorts were socialized in the neoliberal era starting in the 1990s where foreign takeovers were 
increasingly seen as inevitable and economically beneficial. 
A study by Chilton et al. (2017) examines whether the FDI policies that other countries 
adopt influence public support for inward FDI flows. Drawing on survey experiments in the 
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United States and in China, countries with relatively low and high barriers to foreign FDI, 
respectively, they find that reciprocity is an important determinant of public opinion toward 
inward FDI flows. Specifically, their results suggest that a significant driver of individual support 
for foreign acquisitions is whether the potential investments are from countries that allow 
reciprocal investments. Note that the Chinese and American respondents reacted to the 
reciprocity treatment in a similar way. 
Until recently, we knew very little about whether the country that the foreign investment 
originates from is a major determinant of opposition to foreign FDI. This question has come to 
the fore with the sharp rise of investment from emerging market economies, particularly from 
China, into advanced economies in the past decade. A few studies have focused on meso-level 
political reactions to Chinese outward investment. Frye and Pinto (2009) examine the politics of 
Chinese inward investment in the United States by focusing on the preferences and degree of 
opposition amongst decision-makers and key stakeholders based on content analysis of media 
outlets and official publications. In a similar vein, Tingley et al. (2015) examine factors that 
influence political opposition to Chinese mergers and acquisitions in the United States. The main 
results are that American policy-makers are more likely to oppose Chinese acquisitions when the 
target firm is in an industry that is sensitive to national security, when the target firm is large, and 
when the targeted firms are in industries experiencing economic hardship and high 
unemployment. 
Two studies have investigated the effect of the country of origin of foreign investment 
using survey experiments, with similar results. Jensen and Lindstädt (2013) find that American 
and British respondents were significantly more likely to say that German investment was good 
for their respective countries than was the case for Saudi Arabia investment. Similarly, American 
respondents were less likely to support Chinese investment than “generic” foreign investment. In 
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their study on the relationship between reciprocity and support for FDI in the United States, 
Chilton et al. (2017) corroborate the above findings regarding investment from China and Saudi 
Arabia. They also find that the American public is more receptive of investment from Japan. 
One of the main challenges to study public opinion on FDI inflows from China (or other 
emerging market economies for that matter) in advanced economies has been the lack of data. 
Existing national and cross-national surveys do not include the relevant questions or probe facets 
of globalization that at best only provide a very crude proxy for Chinese investment (Burgoon & 
Raess, 2014). We need better, unequivocal survey questions to gauge individual attitudes toward 
Chinese FDI inflows. By designing my own topical module and by fielding it as part of a 
nationally representative survey in Switzerland, the present paper addresses this limitation. 
Among the potential negative economic consequences arising from Chinese investment in 
advanced economies, I argue that one of, if not the main, concern is the transfer of technology 
and know-how. Studies of Chinese FDI in developed countries indicate that it is mainly 
motivated by market-seeking goals (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss, & Zheng, 2007; Kolstad 
& Wiig, 2012). However, strategic asset-seeking FDI where Chinese investors acquire advanced 
technologies, human capital, technical and/or managerial know-how, and internationally 
recognized brands, is on the rise (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Amighini, Rabellotti, & Sanfilippo, 
2013; Vecchi & Brennan, 2014; Curran, Lv, & Spigarelli, 2017). The prevalence of M&As as a 
mode of entry further indicates that Chinese firms are rapidly acquiring technology and know-
how (Deng, 2009; Hanemann & Huotari, 2015). 
Against this background, fears of asset stripping by Chinese investors are rife. Asset 
stripping refers to a corporate strategy that strips bare the assets of the acquired company, closes 
shop, and moves the highly valued assets back home. Chinese firms, private and public alike, 
may seek host-country strategic assets to overcome their inherent disadvantage as late developers 
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(Kedia, Gaffney, & Clampit, 2012) while facing incentives to transfer technology and know-how 
to exploit home country locational advantages such as access to low-cost labor or less stringent 
regulatory environments. Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose foreign investments are 
arguably driven by political motives, may have a particularly strong predisposition to reorganize 
operations according to industrial policy directives and thus to move strategic assets back home 
in the aftermath of M&As. 
I argue that managers in advanced economies will be particularly concerned about the real 
or threatened cross-border transfer of strategic assets associated with Chinese investment for 
several reasons. First, high-ranked managers bear the ultimate responsibility for the success and 
survival of the companies they run. Managers fear plant closures or the winding down of staff 
associated with asset stripping corporate practices because they are concerned about jobs in their 
organizations, including their own. They also fear the negative consequences the theft and 
transfer of assets that are specific to particular locations might have on firm profitability. They 
worry because their reputation as competent and successful managers is at stake. 
Second, managers are likely to be aware and concerned about the lack of reciprocity on 
the regulation of inward foreign investments. Chief executives and senior managers are best 
placed to know about the restrictions imposed on foreign direct investment in China. Since China 
opened its economy to foreign investors, it has pursued an active industrial policy which seeks to 
acquire state-of-the-art technology by requiring foreign investors to enter joint ventures with 
Chinese firms. Advanced economies are typically more open to foreign investment than China is 
(Zhang & van den Bulcke, 2014; Chilton et al., 2017). Against this background, managers may 
well oppose incoming investment from China, not least because asset striping has the potential to 
place domestic firms at a double disadvantage, not only in China but also at home. Managers and 
politicians in advanced countries are increasingly vocal on the issue of high barriers to foreign 
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FDI in China. For instance, the Trump administration has accused the Chinese to steal intellectual 
property from American firms to justify the imposition of tariffs on Chinese imports (Financial 
Times, 2018b). 
Finally, managers also fear that they will be replaced and have less power and influence 
as agents. There is a real risk that Chinese managers take over key leadership and management 
roles. This is likely to be the case especially in SOEs, whose internationalization strategy 
responds to industrial policy objectives dictated by the Chinese state. A large number of Chinese 
firms going abroad are SOEs. Among the top 100 Chinese firms ranked by their OFDI stock in 
2015, just over three quarter (77) are SOEs (MOFCOM, 2016). Moreover, even some of the non-
SOE firms on the list, such as Huawei, have close connections with the Chinese government. 
The threat of asset stripping is strongly linked to Chinese investment due to China’s status 
as late developer, the predominance of SOEs among internationalized firms, and the fact that it is 
the second largest economy and an autocratic country aspiring to play an even more significant, if 
not hegemonic, role in world politics. In any case, FDI among high income countries are not 
associated with the same level of fear related to potential transfer and theft of technology and 
know-how. Arguably, managers in advanced economies might be particularly receptive of 
American FDI due to economic self-interest. Hopkin, Jaupart and Linsi (2018) argue that 
American investors act as a channel for the transmission of a US-style culture of executive pay 
practices abroad. Using micro-level data on executive pay and firm ownership structures in the 
United Kingdom between 2000 and 2015, they find that increases in ownership by American 
investors results in sizable pay increases for senior managers in British firms. 
In the aggregate, Chinese FDI ought to deliver the same economic benefits as other FDI 
flows. Benefits to managers of inward investment are more capital and new market opportunities 
abroad (by tapping into the distribution network of the acquiring firm in its home market) which 
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allows firms to operate more efficiently across borders, reducing production costs, increasing 
economies of scale and promoting specialization. Yet, in the case of Chinese investment, for 
managers the risk of asset stripping might well trump the economic benefits. In any event, this 
forms the basis for the first two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1a: Managers in advanced economies oppose Chinese FDI inflows. 
Hypothesis 1b: Managers in advanced economies oppose Chinese FDI inflows while they do not 
oppose American or European FDI inflows. 
 
The other major economic concern with Chinese investment is social dumping, that is, the 
worsening of labor standards and the hollowing out of protective labor market institutions such as 
collective bargaining arrangements. To the extent that this fear has any material basis and thus 
any political traction, I expect it to be of primary concern to trade unions and, by extension, rank-
and-file union members. That said, the fear of technology transfer and linked job losses is likely 
to be a big concern not only for managers but also for unions. 
Trade unions stand for the interests of workers in their dealings with employers. 
Historically, they have pushed for, and often obtained, improved working conditions through 
negotiated collective agreements, worker-friendly labor legislation (e.g. right to organize, right to 
strike, employment protection) and welfare compensation (e.g. unemployment insurance) to 
protect workers from the vagaries of national and international markets. 
Trade unions in advanced countries have taken an ambivalent but mostly critical stance 
toward international trade, not least out of solidarity with the losers of trade (Ahlquist et al., 
2014), but also due to concerns that increased international trade competition might lead to a race 
to the bottom in labor standards (Hafner-Burton, 2009; Raess, 2014). From the perspective of 
labor, FDI has less severe distributional consequences than trade. On the one hand, FDI increases 
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the demand for all workers, especially skilled workers (Pandya, 2010). As FDI leads to higher 
employment and wages, trade unions ought to be supportive of incoming foreign investment. 
Also trade unions prefer FDI over portfolio investment because FDI are a type of investment with 
a longer time horizon. On the other hand, FDI increases the elasticity of labor demand because 
multinational enterprises are able to shift production across borders, thereby reducing the 
bargaining power of all workers in relation to employers (Rodrik, 1997; Scheve & Slaughter, 
2004). Accordingly, unionized workers, irrespective of their skill level, face incentives to support 
the erection of barriers on inward FDI. In an analysis of American industries between 1981 and 
2000, Owen (2013) finds higher levels of unionization to be associated with greater restrictions 
on inward FDI (see also Owen, 2015). In short, trade unions are likely to be ambivalent on the 
desirability of inward FDI. 
I argue that how trade unions perceive inward FDI in advanced economies will be tainted 
by who the foreign investors are (country of origin of the investor). Specifically, trade unions are 
likely to be pro or contra certain types of inward FDI depending on how foreign investors treat 
their own workers at home. The degree of social embeddedness of markets in the investing 
country may serve as a cue for the treatment of workers by employers. 
In spite of the Chinese political economy officially being a socialist market economy and 
a communist regime, suggesting a system that places the interests and well-being of workers first, 
labor rights and working conditions in China rank amongst the lowest in the world. Over the past 
decades, China has become the workshop of the world, establishing itself as a low-wage producer 
and a country that flouts labor laws in its own workplaces. One important part of China’s 
economic development strategy has been to liberalize labor market regulations in order to attract 
foreign investment (Gallagher, 2005). While successive labor reforms have significantly 
improved labor laws on the books, there is a compliance gap due to low enforcement capacity by 
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the Chinese state and persistent employer violations of labor rights (Estlund, 2017). Moreover, 
Chinese employers have sought to undermine existing industrial relations arrangements in host 
countries, such as in the Piraeus port in Greece (Meunier, 2015). In short, China and its 
employers have a bad press when it comes to protecting or promoting working conditions and 
labor rights at home and abroad. Hence the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Trade union members in advanced economies oppose Chinese FDI inflows. 
 
The political economies of advanced industrial countries vary in their institutional make-
up (Hall & Soskice, 2001), including in the realms of labor relations and social policy. The 
United States is a liberal market economy (LME) characterized by the prevalence of individual 
bargaining and the absence of worker co-determination at the firm-level, so-called “hire and fire 
at will” employment regime, long annual working hours, and a lean welfare state. By contrast, 
most continental European economies are social market economies (SMEs) or coordinated 
market economies (CMEs), depending on the classification adopted, sharing worker-friendly 
institutions such as multi-employer collective bargaining, workplace worker participation through 
works councils, and generous social safety nets. For trade unions, foreign investment stemming 
from the United States might present a threat to existing employment relations and practices. 
Trade unions might rightly fear that American investors will engage workers (and their 
representatives) abroad on the same terms that they engage workers at home, namely union 
avoidance, flexibility (as opposed to employment security), and long working hours, etc. 
While American investment might present a stronger threat to core trade union interests in 
CMEs than in LMEs, there are reasons to believe that trade unions in LMEs will nonetheless be 
critical of American investment. Trade unions typically stand for a more equal distribution of 
income. To the extent that American foreign investment drives upwards the income of top 
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executives in the acquired firms, as is the case in the United Kingdom (Hopkin et al., 2018), and 
thus leads to more unequal societies, trade unions are likely to be at best lukewarm toward such 
investment. 
European investment is likely to be most aligned with workers’ interests in CMEs and 
LMEs alike. European FDI in the aggregate proxies for continental European FDI and thus 
investment from SMEs/CMEs because most large European investing countries, with the major 
exception of the United Kingdom, are from continental Europe. Given that labor standards are 
superior in CMEs than in LMEs, trade unions in LMEs have no particular reason to fear 
European investment, quite the contrary. Regarding intra-CMEs foreign investment, because of 
similar institutional arrangements, the expectation is that European investors will reproduce their 
own, socially embedded industrial relations practices in their foreign subsidiaries. In these 
circumstances, trade unions are likely to be supportive of European investment. Hence the final 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b: Trade union members in advanced economies more strongly support European 
FDI inflows than they do support American FDI inflows and, especially, Chinese FDI inflows. 
 
3. Data 
In order to test these hypotheses, the empirical analysis uses original data from a 
representative survey in Switzerland. I designed my own topical module entitled “Attitudes of 
Swiss citizens toward China as a source of investment and trade”, which was selected on the 
basis of a competitive bid process for insertion in the MOSAiCH 2015 survey (Stähli, Joye, 
Sapin, Pollien, Ochsner, Nisple, & van den Hende, 2015). MOSAiCH,1 a bi-annual cross-
sectional survey, consists of two integrated surveys, the Eurobarometer in Switzerland and the 
1 For more information, see https://forscenter.ch/projects/mosaich/  
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Swiss version of the International Social Survey Programme. In 2015, the themes of the surveys 
were citizenship and the meaning of work. While the main survey was administered using the 
CAPI2 interviewing technique, my module was part of the MOSAiCH 2015 drop-off which was 
delivered to all respondents of the face-to-face survey and conducted using paper and pencil 
mode. The drop-off questionnaire was collected from mid-February to mid-September 2015.3 
My topical module with a variety of survey questions on Swiss foreign economic relations 
amongst others, embedded in the MOSAiCH survey, allows for a comprehensive assessment of 
Swiss citizens’ attitudes toward Chinese inward FDI and a systematic comparison of Swiss 
attitudes toward Chinese, American and European inward FDI. The module also includes 
questions that allow me to test other factors that have been shown to drive support for FDI and 
economic openness more generally, including attitudes toward international trade, sociotropic 
perceptions, firm heterogeneity, and economic knowledge. The main survey provides key 
information on the socio-demographic and employment characteristics of the respondents, their 
nationalist disposition and political ideology. 
While the choice of Switzerland is data related, Switzerland is a small open economy and 
a main destination of foreign investors and therefore a suitable case to address a question 
presented in a more general manner. The focus on the China-America-Europe comparison is 
justified by the relative importance of investment originating in these parts of the world in 
Switzerland. The EU is by far the largest, and the US the second largest, foreign investor in 
Switzerland while China is the fastest growing investor. According to figures from the Swiss 
National Bank (2016), European investors held 78% of FDI stocks (CHF 650 billion) in 
2 Computer-assisted personal interviewing. 
3 77.1% of the respondents to the main survey answered the drop-off questionnaire.  
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Switzerland in 2015, whereas American investors held approximately 12% (CHF 98 billion).4 
Although official Swiss statistics are not available, official Chinese statistics show that Chinese 
outward FDI flows to Switzerland has been on the rise in recent years (Figure 1). While 
approximately 50 Chinese firms had a foothold in Switzerland in 2013/2014, more than 80 Swiss 
companies were in Chinese hands by 2018 (Kessler, Prandini, & Wu, 2014; SWI swissinfo.ch, 
2018). Chinese firms are located in different Swiss cantons, are active in different industries, and 
are small and medium-sized companies (Kessler et al., 2014).5 Moreover, China is Switzerland’s 
main trading partner in Asia and its third-largest trading partner worldwide after the EU and the 
US. In 2013, Switzerland and China signed a free trade agreement, the second such agreement 
China entered with a European country.6 
[Figure 1 about Here] 
In comparative perspective, Switzerland receives neither exceptional nor particularly low 
levels of Chinese FDI. According to data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM, 
2016), Chinese FDI stocks in Switzerland (in US$ millions) as a percentage of Swiss GDP (in 
US$ billions) was 0.91 in 2015. That year, the ratio for other small European economies was as 
follows: 0.88 for Austria; 1.14 for Belgium; 1.21 for Czech Republic; 0.61 for Greece; 4.73 for 
Hungary; 0.36 for Portugal; and 6.86 for Sweden. The EU average (for 21 countries for which 
data is available) was 1.65, driven up by the big economies of France (5.79), Germany (1.75) and 
4 In 2015, foreign companies invested CHF 68 billion in companies in Switzerland, of which CHF 51 billion 
originated in Europe. The single largest European investor was the UK (CHF 14 billion), followed by Luxembourg 
(CHF 14 billion), the Netherlands (CHF 9 billion), Austria (CHF 4 billion), Sweden and Belgium (CHF 2 billion 
each), and Germany and France (CHF 1 billion each). 
5 The acquisition of Swiss biotech giant Syngenta by ChemChina for $43bn in 2016 was at the time of its conclusion 
the largest ever transaction involving a Chinese company abroad. This deal took place after the data for the present 
study was collected. 
6 Earlier that year, Iceland and China concluded a free trade agreement. 
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the United Kingdom (5.82) who receive larger shares of Chinese FDI due to their large internal 
markets.7  
Also, Chinese takeovers grab headlines not just in the United States (Frye & Pinto, 2009), 
but also in Europe and in Switzerland. In Europe, the increased salience of Chinese FDI occurred 
concomitantly with the surge of Chinese investment, which can be dated back to 2009, with the 
European crisis contributing to that surge (Meunier et al., 2014; Meunier, 2014). In Switzerland, 
Sinopec’s acquisition of Geneva-based Addax Petroleum in the energy sector for (at the time) a 
record transaction of $7.2bn in 2009 marked the beginning of a wave of Chinese investment (see 
also Figure 1). The topic of Chinese acquisitions in Switzerland has received extensive coverage 
in the digital and print media in (at least) the two main linguistic regions (e.g., La Liberté, 2013; 
Blick, 2014; NZZ, 2015; RTS, 2015, 2016). 
In all, these considerations suggest that the focus on Switzerland alone is not too narrow 
to make a general statement about attitudes toward Chinese FDI in advanced economies. If 
anything, the Swiss case is a conservative test, since it receives slightly below (EU) average 
Chinese FDI. I expect in particular the findings on managers to travel beyond Switzerland (see 
below the discussion section). While Switzerland is an advanced industrial economy leaning 
more toward the CME model (Hall & Soskice, 2001), it has hybrid features, not least due to a 
flexible labor market (Mach & Trampusch, 2011). In comparative perspective, the Swiss work 
long hours while collective bargaining coverage and employment protection are low. 
Accordingly, if anything, I would expect the fear surrounding Chinese FDI to be somewhat 
stronger in the more socially embedded CMEs and thus trade union members’ opposition to be 
more pronounced in “pure” CMEs than in Switzerland. 
7 The ratio of Chinese FDI stock to GDP was 0.74 and 2.26 in Japan and the United States, respectively.  
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Dependent variables. The original survey question which forms the basis for the main 
dependent variable is: “Do you think that Chinese companies investing in Switzerland is good or 
bad for you?” This question picks up attitudes toward Chinese Greenfield investment and M&As 
because in the questionnaire it directly follows the question probing socio-tropic perceptions 
which refers to both types of Chinese FDI (see below the operationalization of socio-tropic 
perceptions). The question is repeated in relation to American companies as well as European 
companies, allowing to compare Swiss attitudes toward Chinese, American and European FDI. 
Answers are on a 5-point scale, as follows: 1=very bad; 2=somewhat bad; 3=neither good nor 
bad; 4=somewhat good; and 5=very good. The main dependent variable, Pro-Chinese FDI, is a 
dummy where 1 equals opinions that Chinese investment is good or very good (0 otherwise). 
Following a similar construction, I generate the dummies Pro-American FDI and Pro-European 
FDI. 
Independent variables. The MOSAiCH survey has a question about the current (or past) 
occupation of respondents. This information is recorded according to the international standard 
classification of occupations (ISCO-08). The major groups are: 1) Managers; 2) Professionals; 3) 
Technicians and Associate Professionals; 4) Clerical Support Workers; 5) Services and Sales 
Workers; 6) Skilled Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Workers; 7) Craft and Related Trades 
Workers; 8) Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers; 9) Elementary Occupations; 0) 
Armed Forces Occupations. Managers are individuals who plan, direct, coordinate and evaluate 
the overall activities of enterprises, governments and other organizations (or of units within 
them), and formulate and review their policies, laws, rules and regulations. Unlike supervisors, 
classified in other major groups, they have authority to make decisions about the overall strategic 
and operational direction of a business or organizational unit, budgets, and the selection, 
appointment and dismissal of staff. In other words, they are high-level managers. The group of 
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Managers is divided into four sub-groups: 1) 11 Chief Executives, Senior Officials and 
Legislators (further sub-divided into minor groups 111 Legislators and Senior Officials and 112 
Managing Directors and Chief Executives); 2) 12 Administrative and Commercial Managers 
(e.g., finance, human resource, policy and planning, sales and marketing managers); 3) 13 
Production and Specialized Services Managers (e.g., manufacturing, information and 
communication technology services managers); and 4) 14 Hospitality, Retail and Other Services 
Managers (e.g., hotel and restaurant, retail and wholesale trade managers). To generate my 
manager variable I retrench the minor group 111 Legislators and Senior Officials (7 observations) 
from the major group 1) Managers. Manager is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
respondent is a manager (0 otherwise). 
To generate the trade union membership variable I use a survey question which asks 
whether individuals currently are, have been in the past, or have never been member of a trade 
union, an employees’ association or an employers’ association. By way of a statement placed 
before the set of answers, respondents are prompted to respond by excluding their membership in 
professional associations. In order to generate a variable narrowly capturing membership in trade 
unions, I retrench reported (past and present) membership in associations by managers (as 
defined above) as they are likely to be members of an employers’ association rather than a trade 
union. Trade union member is thus equal to 1 if respondents (other than managers) are or have 
been a member of a trade union or of an employee association (0 otherwise). I focus on present as 
well as past members because a stint in trade unions provides exposure to union norms that union 
members internalize and that are likely to shape attitudes (Mosimann & Pontusson, 2017), and 
also because annual union membership turnover (i.e., annual in- and outflows) of 10-12 percent is 
a common feature of Swiss (and West European) union locals (Oesch, 2012). 
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Control variables. First, I control for the respondent’s education level. Education is a 
five-category variable that is equal to 0 for completed secondary school or elementary vocational 
training (1-2 years), 1 for completed vocational training (3-4 years), 2 for completed high school 
(or equivalent), 3 for completed higher vocational training (including degree from a University of 
applied sciences), and 4 for completed higher education. 
Second, I include three socio-demographic variables. Female is a dummy variable where 
female respondents equals 1. Age is the age of respondents in years. Swiss-German captures the 
linguistic region of the survey taker where 1 equals to Swiss-German or Romansh regions (0 if 
French- or Italian-speaking regions). This variable picks up differences that may exist in the 
framing of the survey questions in the various national languages as well as variation in 
perceptions rooted in different cultural identities. 
Third, I include two variables to filter out the distributional effects trade has on workers 
and its impact on consumers by lowering prices. First, I control for attitudes toward Swiss-
Chinese trade relations when estimating attitudes toward Chinese FDI, and for attitudes toward 
Swiss-European trade relations when estimating attitudes toward European FDI. The respective 
survey questions are as follows: “In 2013, Switzerland signed a trade agreement with China, 
reinforcing trade in goods and services. To what extent are you favorable to this policy led by the 
Confederation?”; and “The bilateral relations [with the EU] have reinforced trade in goods and 
services between Switzerland and the EU. To what extent are you favorable to this policy led by 
the Confederation?”. Note that there is no equivalent survey question for Swiss-American trade 
relations since Switzerland and the United States have not concluded a bilateral trade agreement. 
I generated the dummies Pro-China trade and Pro-EU trade by recoding answers on a 5 point-
scale into binary variables where 1 indicates being very favorable or rather favorable to the policy 
in question (0 if neither favorable nor unfavorable, rather unfavorable, or very unfavorable). 
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Second, a question elicited respondents’ views on the idea that more open borders to trade 
decrease prices. Trade lowers prices is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if respondents 
either fully agree or agree with the statement (0 if they neither agree nor disagree, disagree or 
fully disagree). 
The baseline model controls for two information-based factors, namely nationalist 
dispositions and sociotropic perceptions. Nationalism measures opinions on “open borders and 
the intermingling of populations endanger important characteristics of Swiss culture” (1=fully 
disagree; 5= fully agree). Nationalist dispositions should negatively correlate with attitudes 
toward inward FDI because nationalists believe foreign influence to undermine their culture. 
Sociotropic perceptions are measured as the opinions on how Chinese FDI inflows 
(respectively American and Europe FDI inflows) affect the country as whole. The relevant survey 
question reads “Some foreign companies invest in Switzerland, for example by creating or 
buying companies. Do you think it is a good or bad thing for Switzerland that [Chinese], 
[American], [European] companies invest in Switzerland?”. The answers on a 5-point scale 
(1=very good, 2=somewhat good, 3=neither good nor bad, 4=somewhat bad, and 5=very bad) are 
recoded in such a way that Perceived effect of China FDI on country takes the value of 1 if 
respondents think Chinese FDI inflows are good or somewhat good for the country (0 otherwise). 
Perceived effect of US FDI on country and Perceived effect of EU FDI on country are generated 
in a similar way. 
Due to lower coverage, the final three controls are added to the baseline model only one at 
the time, yet I include them jointly in a fully specified model. I control for self-perception of 
ability to understand (international) economics. Economic knowledge is measured as the 
respondent’s answer on 5-point scale (1=fully disagree… and 5=fully agree) to the proposition “I 
understand rather well questions relating to the economy and to commercial relations with other 
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countries”. It is important to control for economic knowledge as Rho and Tomz (2017) have 
shown that many voters do not understand the distributional consequences of foreign economic 
policies such as protectionism (see also Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2006). I also control for political 
ideology. Right ideology is measured as self-placement on a left-right scale for political ideology 
ranging from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right), which is recoded as a trichotomous variable with 0=Left, 
1=Centre, and 2=Right. I expect individuals holding a right-wing ideology to be more supportive 
of inward FDI. 
Finally, I control for the foreign business share of the firm in which respondents work. % 
foreign business is an ordinal variable capturing the relative importance of foreign business 
activities of the firm in which the respondent is employed, measured on a 4-point scale with 
1=none; 2=some; 3=most; 4=all. This variable picks up within-industry firm heterogeneity as per 
“new new trade theory” (Melitz, 2003). NNTT makes a similar prediction about trade preferences 
as does the Ricardo-Viner sectoral model: individuals working for export-oriented firms ought to 
favor free trade. But this firm-based model predicts this variation to be based on the individual’s 
specific business rather than on average industry exports-imports ratios, which has been the 
standard operational measure for testing the sectoral model. As intra-firm trade represents a 
significant share of world trade, FDI and trade tend to be complementary. The implication is that 
an individual working for a firm with a high share of foreign sales brought about through exports 
will tend to support outward FDI as it is associated with an enlargement of the firm’s foreign 
business activities. By extension, such an individual should also support inward FDI because 
opposition to incoming investment is likely to spark foreign retaliations on outward FDI. In other 
words, I expect individuals employed in firm with a higher proportion of foreign business 
activities to more strongly support Chinese, American, and European inward FDI. 
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Industry dummies are included in all models.8 I estimate probit regression models with 
robust standards errors clustered by industry. The results are virtually identical if I use logit 
models instead. Table A1 in the Online Appendix provides summary statistics for all the 
variables. In line with previous studies, I find that the level of support for Chinese FDI inflows in 
advanced economies is considerably lower than the support for FDI inflows from developed 
countries. I also find that the level of support for Chinese FDI in low in absolute terms. Only one 
in six (16.7%) Swiss citizens support Chinese FDI based on material self-interest whereas one in 
four (24.9%) and more than one in three (36.2%) support American and European FDI, 
respectively. About one in three (31.7%) Swiss individuals support Chinese investment based on 
socio-tropic considerations. 
 
4. Results 
I begin the empirical analysis with a series of models with Pro-Chinese FDI as dependent 
variable that include the two predictors and various control variables introduced above (Table 1). 
In the stripped-down model controlling for education and socio-demographic factors (Model 1), 
in line with Hypothesis 1a I find that the coefficient for Manager is negative and statistically 
significant at the 95% level. Managers more strongly opposed Chinese FDI inflows than non-
managers. The coefficient for Union member is positive. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. I thus do not find support for Hypothesis 2a. 
In Model 2, I include views on Swiss-Chinese trade relations (Pro-China trade), opinions 
on how trade impacts consumers (Trade lowers prices), and nationalist sentiment (Nationalism) 
as additional controls. The coefficient for Manager remains negative but nearly doubles in size 
8 The industries are: 1) Agriculture; 2) Manufacturing; 3) Utilities; 4) Construction; 5) Retail and repair; 6) Transport 
and communication; 7) Hotel and restaurant; 8) Financial sector, real estate; 9) Industrial services; 10) Government 
sector; 11) Other services.  
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and is now statistically significant at the 99% level. The coefficient for Union member remains 
positive and statistically insignificant. Although the sample size decreases by 56 observations 
from Model 1 to Model 2, the explanatory power of the model, as measured by the pseudo R-
squared, nearly triples to reach 0.230. 
Model 3 presents the results for the baseline model where I additionally control for socio-
tropic perceptions (Perceived effect of China FDI on country). The coefficient for Managers is 
again negative and highly statistically significant. The substantive effect of this variable is large: 
the odds that a manager is Pro-Chinese FDI is 0.40 times that of non-managers (a 60% 
reduction). The coefficient for Union member is now negative but remains statistically 
insignificant. The results further indicate that respondents who think the impact of Chinese FDI is 
good for Switzerland also think that Chinese FDI is good for them. Including the socio-tropic 
variable significantly increases the explanatory power of the model. The other statistically 
significant control variables are Age, Swiss-German, Pro-China trade, and Nationalism. Older 
individuals, Swiss-German respondents, and nationalists more strongly oppose Chinese FDI 
whereas individuals who support deeper bilateral trade relations are more receptive of Chinese 
FDI. 
Controlling for individual’s economic knowledge (Model 4), political ideology (Model 5), 
and firm-level exposure to trade (Model 6) does not change the main substantive results. As 
expected, the coefficients for Economic knowledge, Right ideology, and % foreign business are 
positive. However, none of the coefficients is statistically significant. Finally, the fully specified 
model (Model 7), which has the smallest number of observations (N=499) yet the highest 
explanatory power (pseudo R2=0.363), yields very similar results. To sum up, I find empirical 
evidence for only one of the fears commonly associated with inward Chinese FDI flows. In line 
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with Hypothesis 1a, the results suggest that managers oppose Chinese investment; contrary to 
Hypothesis 2a, trade union members do not oppose such investment. 
[Table 1 about Here] 
Table 2 displays the results for attitudes toward American FDI inflows as the dependent 
variable. In the stripped-down model (Model 1), the coefficient for Manager is positive and 
statistically insignificant. The coefficient for Union member is also positive and insignificant. 
These results remain unchanged when I control for opinion on trade leads to lower prices and 
nationalist sentiment (Model 2). The coefficient for Manager remains statistically insignificant in 
the baseline (Model 3) and the baseline+ models (Model 4-7). In those models, however, being a 
trade union member is positively and significantly associated with support for American inward 
FDI. With the exception of Age which tends to be insignificant and % foreign business which is 
significant, the (statistically significant) controls perform identically than in the models of 
attitudes toward Chinese FDI. 
[Table 2 about Here] 
Table 3 replicates the analysis this time for attitudes toward European FDI. The 
coefficient for Manager is negative and statistically insignificant in all the estimated models 
(Models1-7). By contrast, the coefficient for Union member is positive and statistically 
significant at conventional levels in all the models (Models 1-7). Trade union membership is thus 
positively associated with support for European FDI inflows. The substantive effect of this 
variable is sizeable: based on the baseline model (Model 3), the odds that a trade union members 
is pro-European FDI is 1.58 times that of an individual who does not belong to a trade union. Age 
and, especially, nationalist sentiment tends not to correlate significantly with support for 
European FDI, the latter result likely reflecting the smaller cultural distance between Switzerland 
and Europe than between Switzerland and the United States or China. Support for Swiss-EU 
26 
 
bilateral trade relations, socio-tropic perceptions, and firm-level exposure to trade all correlate 
positively with support for European FDI. 
[Table 3 about Here] 
Comparing the results of how managers view the quality of Chinese versus American 
versus European FDI (Tables 1-3), it turns out that manager opposition to inward FDI is unique 
to Chinese investment. I thus find support for Hypothesis 1b. Looking at trade union members’ 
attitudes in comparative perspective (Tables 1-3), union members not only prefer European over 
Chinese FDI but they also prefer European over American FDI although the latter difference is 
clearly less pronounced. And yet, taking all models into consideration, the coefficient for union 
member as a determinant of support for American FDI is less significant and tends to be smaller 
in size than the comparable coefficient in the models of support for European FDI. Overall, the 
results provide support for Hypothesis 2b. 
Interestingly, education is not a statistically significant predictor of Chinese, American, or 
European FDI. This result holds up if I use years of schooling as an alternative measure for 
education. By contrast, the share of foreign business is positively and significantly correlated 
with attitudes toward American and, especially, European FDI. Assuming complementarity 
between trade and FDI, one possible reason why foreign business share is only significant for 
European and American inward FDI is reciprocity, given that Swiss FDI into the EU and the US 
represents the lion’s share of outward Swiss FDI. Alternatively, this could just be the result of 
how much more European and American investment into Switzerland there is. The size of the 
coefficients for % foreign business and level of significance follow the ranking of the three 
sources by proportion of inward FDI. In any case, I do not find any evidence suggesting that FDI 
preferences are egocentric on the basis of factors. 
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5. Robustness checks 
 I ran several checks to see how robust the results are to particular decisions made in terms 
of operationalization. First, I tested whether the results are robust to alternative measurement of 
the dependent variable. I used two alternative measures. Following Mansfield and Mutz (2009) I 
generated an alternative binary variable where individuals who refused to answer or expressed no 
opinion were assigned to the middle category (“3=neither good nor bad”) and thus, as a result of 
the binary construction of the dependent variable, ended up with those individuals who think 
[Chinese][American][European] FDI is either very bad or somewhat bad (Models 8, Tables 1-3). 
The main substantive results hold up. Next, I generated an ordinal variable that takes the full 
range of values on the 5-point scale (1=very bad; … 5=very good) (Models 9, Tables 1-3). This is 
a hard test as it takes into account not just whether individuals are overall positive, negative or 
neutral with respect to incoming FDI from different countries, but also differences in their degree 
of support or opposition. Given how ignorant many citizens are about the distributional effects of 
foreign economic policies (Rho and Tomz 2017), one can reasonably doubt the accuracy of self-
assessment of the extent of individual support or opposition to incoming FDI. In any event, the 
results corroborate the substantive findings regarding the attitudes of managers. Regarding the 
results for union members, the coefficient for Union member in the model with European FDI as 
dependent variable, albeit correctly signed, loses statistically significant (Model 9, Table 3). 
Second, I restrict the sample to the working age population and exclude individuals who 
have never had a paid job (Models 10, Tables 1-3). I expect the main coefficients of interest to be 
larger in size in this reduced sample because labor market participants are directly affected by 
inward FDI whereas retried people and people who are in formation are not. This is exactly what 
the findings show. 
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Finally, the results are robust to alternative measurement of the trade union variable. If I 
do not retrench manager’s membership in employee/employer association in the construction of 
the trade union variable, the results are similar. If anything the statistical significance of the 
positive correlations between trade union membership and attitudes toward European FDI is 
reinforced whereas the statistical significance for the associations between union member and 
pro-American FDI attitude is reduced, thereby providing a sharper contrast between union 
members’ support for European vs. American FDI (and hence even stronger support for 
Hypothesis 2b). 
 
6. Discussion 
 The motives for Chinese firms to expand in Switzerland and the FDI regulatory 
framework allow me to shed light on the nature of the opposition to Chinese FDI inflows by 
Swiss managers. First, based on interviews with (where possible European and Chinese) senior 
managers or CEOs at 20 Chinese companies located in Switzerland, a study found that “[T]he 
main motivations to settle in Switzerland are brand building, access to the label ‘Switzerland’ and 
strategic assets” (Kessler et al., 2014, p. 29). Second, the study also found that “[T]he Chinese 
government is a significant force behind the investment process of Chinese companies” (Kessler 
et al., 2014, p. 25). Third, Switzerland (and the EU and the US for that matter) is characterized by 
low regulatory restrictions on inward FDI whereas China continues to apply a number of 
discriminatory measures to foreign investors (Zhang & van den Bulcke, 2014). The regulatory 
environments for incoming FDI can be assessed based on the OECD’s FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index, which measures the statutory restrictions on inward FDI (1 indicates full 
restriction; 0 no restrictions). The overall restrictiveness score in 2015 for Switzerland (0.083) 
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was considerably lower than for China (0.386).9 In short, these are precisely the features of 
Chinese investment and contextual factors that were expected to arouse concerns from managers. 
These concerns are nicely summarized in the 2016 Situation Report by the Swiss intelligence 
agency, indicating, by the way, that they are increasingly shared by politicians: 
“Chinese companies and investors have a particular interest in this country’s industrial 
and financial sectors and in innovative companies, for Switzerland is a world leader in 
areas in which China still has some catching up to do. Through takeovers of Swiss 
companies and increasingly also Swiss hotels, China is attempting to secure the know-
how that it desires and to acquire Swiss brands together with their good reputations. 
However, cooperation with China is not based on the principle of reciprocity. Beijing 
does not grant its foreign trading partners the same access to the Chinese sales and 
investment market as is granted to Chinese companies abroad. A number of branches 
of the economy and of the financial market are closed off by the state’s protectionist 
industrial policy” (FIS 2016, p. 31).  
 
While the concerns of managers are unique to Chinese investment, they are unlikely to be unique 
to Swiss senior executives. They are likely to be observed among high-level managers in other 
advanced industrial countries because the features of Chinese investment and FDI regulatory 
contexts in these countries are very similar to those in Switzerland. 
 To shed further light on the observed union membership results, I examine the influence 
trade unions may exert on the foreign economic policy views of their members (Kim & Margalit, 
2017). To do this, I leverage a survey question which asks respondents to give their opinion (on a 
5-point scale) on the proposition “workers need unions”. Affirmative answers can be interpreted 
as support for the view that unions are good for workers. Pro-union attitude equals 1 if 
respondents answer fully agree or somewhat agree (0 otherwise). Needless to say perhaps, 
individuals can express sympathy for unions, for instance due to belief in norms of solidarity or 
equality, without being a union member. Indeed, the coefficient of correlation between Union 
9 In the sample of 23 EU countries for which data is available the overall restrictiveness index was 0.033 whereas for 
the US it was 0.089. The OECD average was 0.066. Data source is OECD.Stat, OECD FDI Regulatory 
Restrictiveness Index (database accessed on December 12, 2018). 
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member and Pro-union is 0.15. If unions shape their members’ preferences on foreign economic 
policies, it ought to occur through the dissemination of information via internal channels of 
communication such as trade union magazines and propaganda materiel. In short, to the extent 
that one finds an effect for union membership but not for pro-union attitude, this would suggest 
that trade unions are a prime vehicle for FDI preference formation among rank-and-files. 
 In Table 4 I re-ran the baseline models (Model 3) from Tables 1-3 this time including the 
Pro-union variable. The coefficients for Pro-union do not return statistically significant in any of 
the models. Comparing the results for Union member and Pro-union suggests that trade unions 
appear to play a critical role in socializing their members into holding particular views about 
inward FDI. Future research ought to perform content analysis of trade union publications and 
carry out interviews with union officials to help unearth how trade unions perceive inward FDI 
from different countries, whether the origins of capital influence what they say and do, and if so 
why, in order to see whether there is indeed a congruence between the views held by union 
officials and those held by rank-and-files as observed in this study. 
[Table 4 about Here] 
What might explain the lack of opposition of Swiss trade union members in to incoming 
Chinese FDI? For one, trade union officials might perceive Chinese investors, especially Chinese 
SOEs, to be “patient capitalists” who operate with a long term horizon that dovetails with 
workers’ interests.10 Second, they might view Chinese investment to be long term projects driven 
by strategic considerations and market access motivations. Third, Chinese investors might be 
given the benefit of the doubt given the lack of prior experience with such investors. These 
considerations might well balance out fears of social dumping. 
 
10 On China’s state-led capitalism as an important form of patient capital, see Kaplan (2016). 
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7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the demand-side politics of China’s “go global” strategy by focusing 
on attitudes individuals in advanced economies hold toward incoming Chinese investment. I 
expect the fears of the transfer of technology and know-how and of social dumping to drive 
attitudes toward Chinese FDI inflows, fears that should be best captured by negative attitudes 
toward such investment by managers and union members, respectively. Moreover, by comparing 
attitudes toward Chinese FDI with attitudes toward American and European FDI, I test whether 
the determinants of Chinese FDI inflows are distinctive. While I expect the fear or threat of asset 
stripping to be unique to Chinese FDI, I expect the fear or threat of social dumping to hold for 
Chinese FDI and to a lesser extent for American FDI. 
Using original data from a representative national survey fielded in Switzerland, I find 
that managers strongly oppose Chinese FDI whereas they do not oppose American or European 
FDI. The results further suggest that FDI preferences are egocentric on the basis of occupations 
(and firms), not on the basis of broad factors such as skill level. Against the expectations, I do not 
find that trade union members oppose Chinese incoming investment (but neither do they embrace 
such investment). However, I find that union members support European FDI more strongly than 
they do support American FDI and, especially, Chinese FDI. Supplementary analysis suggests 
that what trade unions think and do appears to influence how trade union members perceive FDI 
inflows originating from different countries. In short, the analysis suggests that the fear of 
technology transfer/asset stripping is the key driver of opposition to Chinese FDI and that the 
demand-side politics of Chinese inward FDI is unique. The lack of support by the rank-and-files 
of two powerful interest groups (employers and unions) implies a narrow basis of support for 
Chinese FDI in advanced economies. China is walking on thin ice with its global buying spree. 
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Figure 1. Chinese outward FDI to Switzerland (in million US$), 2004-2015 
 
Data source: MOFCOM (2008, 2016) 
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
m
ea
n 
of
 fd
i
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
39 
 
Table 1. Attitudes toward Chinese FDI inflows 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered over industry; industry dummies not shown; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Manager -0.249** -0.450*** -0.449*** -0.433*** -0.471** -0.444** -0.430** -0.410** -0.284** -0.681*** 
 (0.104) (0.139) (0.169) (0.147) (0.185) (0.211) (0.208) (0.167) (0.129) (0.229) 
Union member 0.084 0.065 -0.028 0.020 -0.097 0.026 -0.011 -0.042 -0.096 0.139 
 (0.194) (0.192) (0.223) (0.228) (0.227) (0.228) (0.230) (0.212) (0.117) (0.208) 
Education 0.063 -0.023 -0.060 -0.070 -0.097 -0.037 -0.081 -0.051 0.045 -0.085 
 (0.041) (0.052) (0.069) (0.075) (0.077) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.042) (0.104) 
Female -0.472*** -0.355* -0.167 -0.119 -0.179 -0.246 -0.201 -0.200 0.038 -0.192 
 (0.163) (0.201) (0.182) (0.155) (0.179) (0.167) (0.163) (0.196) (0.142) (0.197) 
Age -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.005*** -0.012** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Swiss-German -0.241 -0.447** -0.480** -0.456** -0.546*** -0.551*** -0.603*** -0.521*** -0.020 -0.330 
 (0.185) (0.200) (0.203) (0.183) (0.174) (0.201) (0.190) (0.178) (0.156) (0.228) 
Pro-China trade  1.389*** 0.917*** 0.875*** 0.906*** 0.960*** 0.910*** 0.838*** 0.824*** 0.947*** 
  (0.148) (0.153) (0.143) (0.161) (0.204) (0.197) (0.172) (0.080) (0.141) 
Trade lowers prices  0.056 0.031 -0.009 0.073 0.045 0.044 0.046 0.020 -0.032 
  (0.189) (0.185) (0.185) (0.183) (0.223) (0.219) (0.175) (0.110) (0.182) 
Nationalism  -0.089* -0.133** -0.122** -0.198** -0.114* -0.147 -0.104* -0.091*** -0.200*** 
  (0.050) (0.059) (0.061) (0.089) (0.067) (0.112) (0.056) (0.031) (0.056) 
Perceived effect of 
China FDI on country 
  1.173*** 1.118*** 1.209*** 1.224*** 1.223*** 1.137*** 1.226*** 1.170*** 
  (0.131) (0.146) (0.120) (0.128) (0.126) (0.128) (0.111) (0.129) 
Economic knowledge    0.157   0.253**    
    (0.148)   (0.123)    
Right ideology     0.125  0.097    
     (0.137)  (0.165)    
% foreign business      0.024 -0.038    
      (0.112) (0.119)    
Constant -4.933*** -3.823*** -4.773*** -5.141*** -4.693*** -4.676*** -4.409*** -4.811***  -4.814*** 
 (0.242) (0.306) (0.378) (0.540) (0.338) (0.333) (0.471) (0.368)  (0.429) 
Observations 671 615 596 573 562 546 499 685 596 465 
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.230 0.327 0.319 0.342 0.346 0.363 0.319 0.188 0.333 
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Table 2. Attitudes toward American FDI inflows 
Notes: see Table 1 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Manager 0.092 0.084 -0.049 -0.024 -0.091 0.036 -0.010 -0.040 -0.094 -0.018 
 (0.188) (0.169) (0.138) (0.149) (0.131) (0.149) (0.157) (0.134) (0.132) (0.263) 
Union member 0.126 0.100 0.242** 0.297** 0.228** 0.317*** 0.327*** 0.211** -0.006 0.279* 
 (0.094) (0.113) (0.112) (0.121) (0.115) (0.099) (0.102) (0.106) (0.112) (0.154) 
Education 0.052 0.030 -0.011 -0.018 -0.020 -0.018 -0.030 -0.005 0.028 -0.038 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.047) (0.054) (0.051) (0.047) (0.055) (0.053) (0.023) (0.070) 
Female -0.119 -0.150 -0.048 -0.037 -0.066 -0.107 -0.109 -0.106 0.034 -0.040 
 (0.108) (0.112) (0.109) (0.114) (0.121) (0.102) (0.117) (0.121) (0.102) (0.176) 
Age -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007* -0.007* -0.005 -0.0048** -0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Swiss-German -0.213 -0.236 -0.357*** -0.369*** -0.390*** -0.421*** -0.452*** -0.412*** -0.127 -0.295 
 (0.156) (0.164) (0.136) (0.141) (0.134) (0.129) (0.137) (0.116) (0.108) (0.196) 
Trade lowers prices  0.214* 0.052 0.032 0.075 0.060 0.080 0.082 0.096 -0.041 
  (0.122) (0.123) (0.126) (0.128) (0.140) (0.147) (0.108) (0.066) (0.184) 
Nationalism  -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.136*** -0.152** -0.133** -0.125* -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.187*** 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.063) (0.053) (0.075) (0.047) (0.039) (0.046) 
Perceived effect of US 
FDI on country 
  1.454*** 1.410*** 1.421*** 1.383*** 1.320*** 1.368*** 1.457*** 1.424*** 
  (0.143) (0.139) (0.135) (0.145) (0.132) (0.141) (0.133) (0.153) 
Economic knowledge    0.047   0.074    
    (0.131)   (0.120)    
Right ideology     0.064  0.034    
     (0.081)  (0.097)    
% foreign business      0.132** 0.114*    
      (0.058) (0.065)    
Constant -1.253*** -0.788*** -0.929*** -0.875** -0.948*** -0.853*** -0.930** -1.108***  -0.688** 
 (0.199) (0.271) (0.260) (0.364) (0.258) (0.297) (0.432) (0.277)  (0.269) 
Observations 690 655 631 604 593 576 525 725 631 490 
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.070 0.258 0.253 0.255 0.256 0.248 0.244 0.165 0.259 
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Table 3. Attitudes toward European FDI 
Notes: see Table 1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Manager -0.060 -0.066 -0.111 -0.122 -0.166 -0.070 -0.141 -0.101 -0.125 -0.040 
 (0.229) (0.228) (0.295) (0.283) (0.292) (0.303) (0.284) (0.280) (0.221) (0.361) 
Union member 0.259** 0.257** 0.276** 0.328** 0.228* 0.335*** 0.310*** 0.290** 0.083 0.384*** 
 (0.105) (0.121) (0.140) (0.140) (0.131) (0.118) (0.107) (0.129) (0.114) (0.142) 
Education 0.033 0.0001 -0.054 -0.075 -0.075 -0.068 -0.098 -0.057 0.012 -0.076 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.062) (0.067) (0.064) (0.066) (0.068) (0.071) (0.046) (0.083) 
Female -0.235*** -0.225*** -0.191 -0.166 -0.224** -0.234* -0.264*** -0.262** -0.156 -0.272* 
 (0.077) (0.075) (0.119) (0.125) (0.105) (0.120) (0.100) (0.125) (0.103) (0.143) 
Age -0.0002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006** -0.006** -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Swiss-German -0.154 -0.198 -0.292* -0.302* -0.339** -0.342** -0.379** -0.361*** -0.229 -0.232 
 (0.170) (0.170) (0.160) (0.161) (0.160) (0.154) (0.156) (0.138) (0.141) (0.192) 
Pro-EU trade  0.475*** 0.337** 0.315** 0.351** 0.505*** 0.520*** 0.271** 0.442*** 0.440*** 
  (0.125) (0.131) (0.130) (0.154) (0.159) (0.181) (0.108) (0.128) (0.148) 
Trade lowers prices  0.197** 0.074 0.043 0.091 0.047 0.061 0.107 0.055 -0.037 
  (0.084) (0.096) (0.097) (0.105) (0.105) (0.129) (0.078) (0.079) (0.133) 
Nationalism  -0.051 -0.054 -0.056 -0.074* -0.035 -0.041 -0.056 -0.041 -0.036 
  (0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.040) (0.054) (0.059) (0.043) (0.040) (0.024) 
Perceived effect of EU 
FDI on country 
  1.149*** 1.118*** 1.131*** 1.107*** 1.044*** 1.056*** 1.062*** 1.175*** 
  (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.116) (0.128) (0.118) (0.110) (0.150) 
Economic knowledge    0.090   0.101    
    (0.080)   (0.082)    
Right ideology     0.053  -0.002    
     (0.083)  (0.083)    
% foreign business      0.195*** 0.175**    
      (0.069) (0.070)    
Constant -0.847*** -0.827*** -1.037*** -1.205*** -0.989*** -1.276*** -1.429*** -1.089***  -1.102*** 
 (0.153) (0.237) (0.249) (0.246) (0.269) (0.253) (0.354) (0.252)  (0.362) 
Observations 704 649 628 601 591 578 525 712 628 483 
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.071 0.167 0.166 0.165 0.186 0.181 0.154 0.122 0.194 
 
42 
 
Table 4. Effects of union membership vs. pro-union attitude 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 DV=Pro-Chinese 
FDI 
DV=Pro-American 
FDI 
DV=Pro-European 
FDI 
Manager -0.469*** -0.054 -0.117 
 (0.181) (0.121) (0.295) 
Union member -0.007 0.230** 0.264* 
 (0.218) (0.109) (0.152) 
Pro-union -0.050 0.007 0.043 
 (0.184) (0.150) (0.136) 
Education -0.090 -0.018 -0.053 
 (0.072) (0.045) (0.060) 
Female -0.204 -0.061 -0.203* 
 (0.204) (0.111) (0.122) 
Age -0.014*** -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Swiss-German -0.534*** -0.370*** -0.317* 
 (0.206) (0.139) (0.165) 
Pro-China trade 1.030***   
 (0.179)   
Pro-EU trade   0.352*** 
   (0.129) 
Trade lowers prices -0.001 -0.014 0.061 
 (0.173) (0.059) (0.096) 
Nationalism -0.134** -0.147*** -0.058 
 (0.061) (0.053) (0.042) 
Perceived effect of China FDI on 
country 
1.195***   
(0.137)   
Perceived effect of US FDI on 
country 
 1.451***  
 (0.142)  
Perceived effect of EU FDI on 
country 
  1.141*** 
  (0.136) 
Constant -4.664*** -0.877** -1.055*** 
 (0.375) (0.346) (0.210) 
Observations 586 621 619 
Pseudo R-squared 0.341 0.256 0.169 
Notes: see Table 1 
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Online Appendix 
 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max 
Pro-Chinese FDI 694 0.167 0.373 0 0 1 
Pro-American FDI 712 0.249 0.433 0 0 1 
Pro-European FDI 727 0.362 0.481 0 0 1 
Manager 1,190 0.097 0.296 0 0 1 
Union member 1,216 0.245 0.430 0 0 1 
Education 1,232 1.735 1.302 0 1 4 
Female 1,235 0.511 0.500 0 1 1 
Age 1,235 48.860 17.875 18 49 94 
Swiss-German 1,235 0.718 0.450 0 1 1 
Pro-China trade 843 0.493 0.500 0 0 1 
Pro-EU trade 873 0.759 0.428 0 1 1 
Trade lowers prices 1,144 0.475 0.500 0 0 1 
Nationalism 1,200 2.953 1.043 1 3 5 
Perceived effect of China FDI on country 778 0.317 0.466 0 0 1 
Perceived effect of US FDI on country 798 0.425 0.495 0 0 1 
Perceived effect of EU FDI on country 807 0.653 0.476 0 1 1 
Economic knowledge 852 3.352 0.919 1 3 5 
Right ideology 1,111 1.063 0.663 0 1 2 
% foreign business 824 1.468 0.758 1 1 4 
Pro-union 1,199 0.706 0.456 0 1 1 
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